• Casino Players Card Scams
• Casino Players Club Card Scams
• Casino Players Card Scam Phone Calls

• The Players Rewards Card Team scours the internet to find the best gaming options most suitable for you. This includes rare bonus opportunities, notable new destinations, and seasonal and topical promotions. Instant access to rewards that make your online payments seamless and hassle-free is the aim of the Players Rewards Card.
• Cheating in casinos refers to actions by the player or the house which are prohibited by regional gambling control authorities. This may involve using suspect apparatus, interfering with apparatus, chip fraud or misrepresenting games. The formally prescribed sanctions for cheating depend on the circumstances and gravity of the cheating and the jurisdiction in which the casino operates.

The scam was rumbled after Ni and the other players went on a major lucky streak, winning 18 of 21 hands, including 14 straight wins, in a game in which the odds are essentially a coin-flip. Both the online casinos and credit card companies consider illegitimate charging back as fraud and the consequences for the player are disastrous. The credit card company will cancel the card and therefore the player will not be able to use it for other purposes as well. Crane blew the lid on the rewards card scam in 2016, testifying in court against casino executive Robert Pellegrini and his two accomplices, Mark Joseph Heltzel and Rachel Poszeluznyj, all of whom.

This document describes factors that a casino or card club may need to consider in applying a risk-based approach to the development and implementation of a Bank Secrecy Act ('BSA') compliance program. The BSA requires casinos and card clubs to develop and implement compliance programs tailored to business activities and customer risk profiles (e.g., type of products and services offered, the locations served, and the nature of their customers). Please note that the business/customer risk factors described below will not apply equally to all casinos and card clubs, and even when these factors are present, there may be different risk outcomes for different casinos and card clubs. A casino or card club may not be required to address each of the factors described below; also a casino or card club should not construe the risk indicators below as exhaustive and the only ones required to be addressed.

I. General Business Risk Indicators

There are many risk indicators or factors that a casino or card club may need to consider when developing and implementing an effective BSA compliance program to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Risk factors may differ depending on the business activities of a specific gambling establishment, or its products and services, as well as state, tribal or local gambling regulations that affect the gaming operation. Also, a casino or card club may need to consider the risk management principles that it applies in its operational areas when assessing and managing its BSA risk profile.

A casino or card club may need to consider, as appropriate, the following factors when developing and implementing risk-based policies, procedures, internal controls and systems to comply with the BSA:

• Gross annual gaming revenue ('GAGR') of the business as well as GAGR by type of gambling offered (e.g., table games, card games, slot machines, video lottery terminals, sports book betting, pari-mutuel wagering on horse or dog races);
• Overall physical layout of gambling establishment (e.g., square footage and gambling floor layout);
• Governmental wagering limitations or other legal constraints on betting or the types of games offered;
• Types of gambling offered (e.g., table games, card games, slot machines, video lottery terminals, sports book betting, pari-mutuel wagering on horse or dog races);
• Types of specific games offered (e.g., roulette, baccarat/mini-baccarat, or craps, which allow a pair of bettors to cover between them both sides of an even bet);
• Number of table games, card games, slot machines/video lottery terminals offered;
• Number of table games, slot machines or video lottery terminals with high dollar maximum bet limits;
• Number and location of cages and slot redemption booths;
• Number of cage windows and race/sports book windows;
• Number of slot kiosks for ticket redemptions and maximum dollar thresholds;
• Types of financial services offered at the cage (e.g., deposit accounts, credit/marker accounts, account access cards, check cashing accounts, currency exchange services), any limitations on financial services, and other types of payment methods accepted (e.g., credit cards, debit instruments, wire transfers);
• Types of negotiable instruments accepted for cashing, credit, deposit, and purchase of gaming instruments (e.g., business checks, cashier's checks, foreign drafts, domestic or international money orders, official bank checks, personal checks, promissory notes, third-party checks, domestic or foreign traveler's checks);
• Business and personal check cashing dollar limits;
• Whether customers can wire funds domestically or internationally through a domestic depository institution for deposit or payment of markers into their personal casino accounts;
• Whether a third-party contractor provides check cashing or money transmitting for customers on the premises;
• Whether a third-party contractor provides race and sports book wagering within a casino, and the extent to which a casino conducts such customer transactions on behalf of a third-party contractor;
• Types of financial transactions that a casino 'host' can conduct on behalf of customers;
• Whether customers are allowed to conduct transactions through chip runners and the types of transactions that can be conducted;
• Whether the casino or card club is located in a High Intensity Financial Crime Area ('HIFCA');¹
• Whether the casino or card club is located in a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area ('HIDTA');²
• Whether the casino or card club is located in a town or city center, or in a more remote location;
• Whether the casino or card club is located near a U.S. land border crossing;
• Proximity of the casino or card club to any interstate freeways which allow customers quick ingress and egress to the gambling operation;
• Whether the casino or card club is owned by a state or tribal government, privately owned, a combination of state and private entities, or is a publicly traded company;
• Whether a casino is owned by a corporation that operates other casinos in the same state or other states, as well as other countries;
• Number of employees, experience levels, and turnover rate of key personnel and frontline employees;
• Number of surveillance employees and ratio of employees to surveillance cameras;
• Number of fiduciary accounts that are opened annually (e.g., deposit accounts, credit/marker accounts, check cashing);
• Number of marketing accounts that are opened annually (e.g., player rating and slot club);
• Geographic marketing areas, such as international, regional, and local marketing areas, as well as relative concentration in these markets;
• Business clientele model and profile (e.g., a large number of customers who gamble relatively small amounts of money, a large number of customers who gamble relatively large amounts of money, a small number of customers who gamble relatively small amounts of money, a small number of customers who gamble relatively large amounts of money, or some combination of these); and
• Customer base (number of accountholders versus estimated number of non-accountholders, organized casino tours/junkets, estimated number of local customers versus estimated number of travelers or tourists).

II. Customer Risk Indicators

Although any type of customer activity is potentially vulnerable to money laundering or terrorist financing, certain customers may pose specific risks. In assessing customer risk, casinos and card clubs may need to consider other variables, such as services sought, products used, and geographical locations. For example, a casino or card club may need to consider the following:

• Particular aspects of operations (i.e., products, services, games, and accounts or account activities) that can be used by customers to facilitate money laundering and terrorist financing;
• Non-resident aliens and foreign nationals with deposit accounts who are citizens of countries or jurisdictions that are:
  • Identified as non-cooperative by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)³ ,
  • Identified as Jurisdictions of Concern or Jurisdictions of Primary Concern in the U.S. Department of State's annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)⁴,
  • Designated as jurisdictions of primary money laundering concern or subject to special measures through regulations issued by FinCEN, pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act⁵, or
  • Sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), including those with state sponsored terrorism⁶.
• Customers with significant levels of gambling (e.g., in amounts of $3,000 - $10,000 inclusive) that are non-accountholders and for which identification is not known and is unavailable;
• Customers that pose higher risks based on type of account, account activity, types of products and services used, geographic locality, or player ratings, etc.;
• Customers that engage in a relatively high level of spending;
• Customers engaged in high value gambling that are inconsistent with a casino or card club's information about levels or sources of assets or incomes, or inconsistent with information about occupations in casino credit/marker account records (e.g., credit/marker applications) or other records;
• Customers using deposit accounts for non-gambling purposes;
• Customers observed borrowing money from non-conventional sources, including other customers;
• Customers conducting transfers of significant or unusual amounts of funds through depository institutions;
• Customers using domestic or international money orders in amounts just below the threshold for recordkeeping requirements, traveler's checks denominated in foreign currency, domestic wire transfers in amounts just below the threshold for recordkeeping requirements, debit cards, and prepaid access (stored value) cards either in significant numbers or with significant total monetary value;
• Customers conducting large transactions with minimal casino play;
• Regular customers with unusual spending pattern changes (e.g., dramatic or rapid increases in the size and frequency of transactions);
• Customers listed on a so-called 'barred patron list' and their known associates;
• Customer player rating and slot club accounts with P.O. Boxes only instead of permanent street addresses;
• Periodic review of FinCEN Form 102, Suspicious Activity Report by Casinos and Card Clubs ('SARCs') filed that are based on direct observation of customer activity and review of customer records;
• Dollar value of intercompany transfers of funds from customers' accounts for front money deposit or marker redemption conducted between casinos in the United States and their affiliated casinos located in other countries.

Once a casino or card club has identified the specific risk factors unique to its operation, it should conduct a more detailed analysis of its level of vulnerability. The level and sophistication of the analysis may depend on the comprehensiveness of a casino or card club's risk assessment process or the risk factors that apply. Also, the results may differ according to its business risk model and governmental gambling regulations. By understanding its risk profile, a casino or card club can apply appropriate risk management processes to its BSA compliance program to identify and mitigate its operational risk.

In conclusion, an effective BSA compliance program must reflect potential money laundering and terrorist financing risks arising from a casino's or card club's products, services, customer base, and geographical location. Casinos or card clubs may need to update their risk indicators to reflect changes in operational risk profiles (e.g., revised products and services, new products and services, changes with regard to opening and closing accounts or closer monitoring of accounts, new categories of accounts, or changes resulting from acquisitions or mergers). It is a sound practice for a casino or card club to periodically review its risk indicators or factors to assure sufficiency and effectiveness.

For questions about this guidance, please contact FinCEN's Regulatory Helpline at (800) 949-2732.

For additional guidance, see Casino or Card Club Compliance Program Assessment, FIN-2010-G003 (June 30, 2010) and Frequently Asked Questions - Casino Recordkeeping, Reporting and Compliance Program Requirements, FIN-2007-G005 (November 14, 2007) and FIN-2009-G004 (September 30, 2009). Other reference material includes Suspicious Activity Report Filings Within the Casino and Card Club Industries, The SAR Activity Review, Trends, Tips and Issues, Issue 8 (April 2005) and FinCEN SAR Bulletin, Issue 2: Suspicious Activities Reported by Casinos (August 2000).

^{1 Locations designated as HIFCAs enable a concentration of law enforcement efforts at the federal, state, and local governmental levels. For a listing, seewww.fincen.gov/hifca}

^{2 Locations designated as HIDTAs are provided additional Federal government resources to help eliminate or reduce drug trafficking and its destructive consequences. For a listing, see the Office of National Drug Control Policy's website at www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov.}

^{3 FATF is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of policies, at both the national and international levels, to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Seewww.fatf-gafi.org.}

^{4 See www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt}

^{5 See www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/311-special-measures}

^{6 See www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/}

The MIT Blackjack Team was a group of students and ex-students from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University, and other leading colleges who used card counting techniques and more sophisticated strategies to beat casinos at blackjack worldwide. The team and its successors operated successfully from 1979 through the beginning of the 21st century. Many other blackjack teams have been formed around the world with the goal of beating the casinos.

Blackjack and card counting[edit]

Blackjack can be legally beaten by a skilled player. Beyond the basic strategy of when to hit and when to stand, individual players can use card counting, shuffle tracking, or hole carding to improve their odds. Since the early 1960s, a large number of card counting schemes have been published, and casinos have adjusted the rules of play in an attempt to counter the most popular methods. The idea behind all card counting is that, because a low card is usually bad and a high card usually good, and as cards already seen since the last shuffle cannot be at the top of the deck and thus drawn, the counter can determine the high and low cards that have already been played. They thus know the probability of getting a high card (10,J,Q,K,A) as compared to a low card (2,3,4,5,6).

In 1979, six MIT students and residents of the Burton-Conner House at MIT taught themselves card-counting. They traveled to Atlantic City during the spring break to win their fortune. The group went their separate ways when most of them graduated in May of that year. Most never gambled again, but some of them maintained an avid interest in card counting and remained in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Two of them, J.P. Massar and Jonathan, offered a course on blackjack for MIT's January, 1980 Independent Activities Period (IAP), during which classes may be offered on almost any subject.

First MIT blackjack 'bank'[edit]

In late November 1979, Dave, a professional blackjack player contacted one of the card-counting students, J.P. Massar, after seeing a notice for the blackjack course. He proposed forming a new group to go to Atlantic City to take advantage of the New Jersey Casino Control Commission's recent ruling that made it illegal for the Atlantic City casinos to ban card counters. Casinos instead have to take other countermeasures like shuffling the cards earlier than normal, using more decks of cards, or offering games with worse rules to destroy the advantage gained by counting—even though these all negatively impact the non-counter as well.^[1]

The group of four players, a professional gambler, and an investor who put up most of their capital ($5,000), went to Atlantic City in late December. They recruited more MIT students as players at the January blackjack class. They played intermittently through May 1980 and increased their capital four-fold, but were nonetheless more like a loose group sharing capital than a team with consistent strategies and quality control.

'Mr. M' meets Bill Kaplan[edit]

In May 1980, J. P. Massar, known as 'Mr. M' in the History Channel documentary, overheard a conversation about professional blackjack at a Chinese restaurant in Cambridge. He introduced himself to the speaker, Bill Kaplan, a 1980 Harvard MBA graduate who had run a successful blackjack team in Las Vegas three years earlier. Kaplan had earned his BA at Harvard in 1977 and delayed his admission to Harvard Business School for a year, when he moved to Las Vegas and formed a team of blackjack players using his own research and statistical analysis of the game. Using funds he received on graduation as Harvard's outstanding scholar-athlete, Kaplan generated more than a 35 fold rate of return in fewer than nine months of play.^[2]

Kaplan continued to run his Las Vegas blackjack team as a sideline while attending Harvard Business School but, by the time of his graduation in May 1980, the players were so 'burnt out' in Nevada they were forced to hit the international circuit. Not feeling he could continue to manage the team successfully while they traveled throughout Europe and elsewhere, encountering different rules, playing conditions, and casino practices, Kaplan parted ways with his teammates, who then splintered into multiple small playing teams in pursuit of more favorable conditions throughout the world.

Kaplan observes Massar and friends in action[edit]

After meeting Kaplan and hearing about his blackjack successes, Massar asked Kaplan if he was interested in going with a few of Massar's blackjack-playing friends to Atlantic City to observe their play. Given the fortuitous timing (Kaplan's parting with his Las Vegas team), he agreed to go in the hopes of putting together a new local team that he could train and manage.

Kaplan observed Massar and his teammates playing for a weekend in Atlantic City. He noted that each of the players used a different, and overcomplicated, card counting strategy. This resulted in error rates that undermined the benefits of the more complicated strategies. Upon returning to Cambridge, Kaplan detailed the problems he observed to Massar.

Kaplan capitalizes a new team[edit]

Kaplan said he would back a team but it had to be run as a business with formal management procedures, a required counting and betting system, strict training and player approval processes, and careful tracking of all casino play. A couple of the players were initially averse to the idea. They had no interest in having to learn a new playing system, being put through 'trial by fire' checkout procedures before being approved to play, being supervised in the casinos, or having to fill out detailed player sheets (such as casino, cash in and cash out totals, time period, betting strategy and limits, and the rest) for every playing session. However, their keen interest in the game coupled with Kaplan's successful track record won out.

The newly capitalised 'bank' of the MIT Blackjack Team started on 1 August 1980. The investment stake was $89,000, with both outside investors and players putting up the capital. Ten players, including Kaplan, Massar, Jonathan, Goose, and 'Big Dave' (aka 'coach', to distinguish from the Dave in the first round) played on this bank. Ten weeks later they more than doubled the original stake. Profits per hour played at the tables were $162.50, statistically equivalent to the projected rate of $170/hour detailed in the investor offering prospectus. Per the terms of the investment offering, players and investors split the profits with players paid in proportion to their playing hours and computer simulated win rates. Over the ten-week period of this first bank, players, mostly undergraduates, earned an average of over $80/hour while investors achieved an annualized return in excess of 250%.

Strategy and techniques[edit]

The team often recruited students through flyers and the players' friends from college campuses across the country. The team tested potential members to find out if they were suitable candidates and, if they were, the team thoroughly trained the new members for free. Fully trained players had to pass an intense 'trial by fire,' consisting of playing through 8 six-deck shoes with almost perfect play, and then undergo further training, supervision, and similar check-outs in actual casino play until they could become full stakes players.

The group combined individual play with a team approach of counters and big players to maximize opportunities and disguise the betting patterns that card counting produces. In a 2002 interview in Blackjack Forum magazine,^[3] John Chang, an MIT undergrad who joined the team in late 1980 (and became MIT team co-manager in the mid-1980s and 1990s), reported that, in addition to classic card counting and blackjack team techniques, at various times the group used advanced shuffle and ace tracking techniques. While the MIT team's card counting techniques can give players an overall edge of about 2 percent, some of the MIT team's methods have been established as gaining players an overall edge of about 4 percent.^{[citation needed]} In his interview, Chang reported that the MIT team had difficulty attaining such edges in actual play, and their overall results had been best with straight card counting.

The MIT Team's approach was originally developed by Al Francesco, elected by professional gamblers as one of the original seven inductees into the Blackjack Hall of Fame. Blackjack team play was first written about by Ken Uston, an early member of Al Francesco's teams. Uston's book on blackjack team play, Million Dollar Blackjack, was published shortly before the founding of the first MIT team. Kaplan enhanced Francesco's team methods and used them for the MIT team. The team concept enabled players and investors to leverage both their time and money, reducing their 'risk of ruin' while also making it more difficult for casinos to detect card counting at their tables.

Team history 1980–1990[edit]

The MIT Blackjack Team continued to play throughout the 1980s, growing to as many as 35 players in 1984 with a capitalization of as much as $350,000. Having played and run successful teams since 1977, Kaplan reached a point in late 1984 where he could not show his face in any casino without being followed by the casino personnel in search of his team members. As a consequence he decided to fall back on his growing real estate investment and development company, his 'day job' since 1980, and stopped managing the team. He continued for another year or so as an occasional player and investor in the team, now being run by Massar, Chang and Bill Rubin, a player who joined the team in 1984.

The MIT Blackjack Team ran at least 22 partnerships in the time period from late 1979 through 1989. At least 70 people played on the team in some capacity (either as counters, Big Players, or in various supporting roles) over that time span. Every partnership was profitable during this time period, after paying all expenses as well as the players' and managers' share of the winnings, with returns to investors ranging from 4%/year to over 300%/year.

Strategic Investments 1992–1993[edit]

Casino Players Card Scams

In 1992, Bill Kaplan, J.P. Massar, and John Chang decided to capitalize on the opening of Foxwoods Casino in nearby Connecticut, where they planned to train new players. Acting as the General Partner, they formed a Massachusetts Limited Partnership in June 1992 called Strategic Investments to bankroll the new team. Structured similar to the numerous real estate development limited partnerships that Kaplan had formed, the limited partnership raised a million dollars, significantly more money than any of their previous teams, with a method based on Edward Thorp's high low system. It involved three players: a big player, a controller, and a spotter. The spotter checked when the deck went positive with card counting, the controller would bet small constantly, wasting money, and verifying the spotter's count. Once the controller found a positive, he would signal to the big player. He would make a massive bet, and win big. Confident with this new funding, the three general partners ramped up their recruitment and training efforts to capitalize on the opportunity.

Over the next two years, the MIT Team grew to nearly 80 players, including groups and players in Cambridge, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, California, Illinois, and Washington. Sarah McCord, who joined the team in 1983 as an MIT student and later moved to California, was added as a partner soon after SI was formed and became responsible for training and recruitment of West Coast players.

At various times, there were nearly 30 players playing simultaneously at different casinos around the world, including Native American casinos throughout the country, Las Vegas, Atlantic City, Canada, and island locations. Never before had casinos throughout the world seen such an organized and scientific onslaught directed at the game. While the profits rolled in, so did the 'heat' from the casinos, and many MIT Team members were identified and barred. These members were replaced by fresh players from MIT, Harvard, and other colleges and companies, and play continued. Eventually, investigators hired by casinos realized that many of those they had banned had addresses in or near Cambridge, and the connection to MIT and a formalized team became clear. The detectives obtained copies of recent MIT yearbooks and added photographs from it to their image database.

With its leading players banned from most casinos and other more lucrative investment opportunities opening up at the end of the recession, Strategic Investments paid out its substantial earnings to players and investors and dissolved its partnership on December 31, 1993.

1994 and forward[edit]

After the dissolution of Strategic Investments, a few of the players took their winnings and split off into two independent groups. The Amphibians were primarily led by Semyon Dukach, with Dukach as the big player, Katie Lilienkamp (a controller), and Andy Bloch (a spotter). The other team was the Reptiles, led by Mike Aponte, Manlio Lopez and Wes Atamian. These teams had various legal structures, and at times million dollar banks and 50+ players. By 2000 the 15+ year reign of the MIT Blackjack Teams came to an end as players drifted into other pursuits.

In 1999, a member of the Amphibians won at Max Rubin's 3rd Annual Blackjack Ball competition. The event was featured in an October 1999 Cigar Aficionado article, which said the winner earned the unofficial title 'Most Feared Man in the Casino Business'.^[4]

In the media[edit]

Books[edit]

• A variety of stories about a few of the players from the MIT Blackjack Team formed the basis of The New York Times best-sellingBringing Down the House, written by Ben Mezrich. While originally marketed as nonfiction, Mezrich later admitted characters and stories in the book were mostly fictive and composites of players and stories he had heard about through hearsay. The private investigation firm referred to as Plymouth in Bringing Down the House was Griffin Investigations.^[5]
• Mezrich wrote a follow-up book, Busting Vegas, which took even greater liberty with the actual happenings of the team. Many events in this book were at least partly based on incidents that occurred during the team's Strategic Investments era.^[6]
• Jeffrey Ma wrote a book titled The House Advantage: Playing the Odds to Win Big in Business about his time on the 1994 MIT blackjack team.
• Nathaniel Tilton, a student of former MIT team captains Mike Aponte and Semyon Dukach, authored The Blackjack Life detailing his experiences playing and being trained by the MIT Blackjack Team players.^[7]

Films[edit]

• The 2004 film The Last Casino is loosely based on this premise and features three students and a professor counting cards in Ontario and Quebec.^[8]
• The 2008 film 21, inspired by Bringing Down the House and produced by and starring Kevin Spacey and Jim Sturgess, was released on March 28, 2008 by Columbia Pictures. Jeff Ma and Henry Houh, former players on the team, appear in the movie as casino dealers, and Bill Kaplan appears in a cameo in the background of the underground Chinese gambling parlor scene. The script took significant artistic license with events, with most of its plot being invented for the movie, hence it refers to being 'inspired by true events' rather than 'based on true events.' One of the most significant departures from reality was the portrayal of the team being run by a professor (the Kevin Spacey character), when in reality the team was always run by students and alumni. The characters in the movie were also fictionalized amalgams of various players throughout the years of the team's existence - for example, the character Choi is very loosely (and inaccurately) based on Johnny Chang, and the character Ben Campbell, is an amalgam of numerous players, with the opening scene based on Big Dave's interview, and subsequent admission to Harvard Medical School, where much of the interview revolved around his participation on the team.
• The 2010 film Teen Patti is an uncredited remake of 21.

Television[edit]

• The Mysteries at the Museum series on the Travel Channel featured the story of the MIT Blackjack Team in the episode titled 'Siamese Twins, Assassin Umbrella, Capone's Cell'.
• The story of the MIT Blackjack Team, in its incarnation as Strategic Investments, was told in The History Channel documentary, Breaking Vegas, directed by Bruce David Klein.
• The Bringing Down The House period was featured on episodes of the Game Show Network documentary series, Anything to Win, and HBO's Real Sports with Bryant Gumbel (episode 116).
• The BBC documentary, Making Millions the Easy Way, addressed the Bringing Down the House period as part of the renowned 'Horizon' strand (directed by Johanna Gibbon), told the story of a Strategic Investments breakaway group, and revealed the science behind the winning formula.
• 'Double Down', an episode of Numb3rs concerned a counting group, led by a High School teacher, which launders money through casino winnings.

Other[edit]

Several members of the two teams have used their expertise to start public speaking careers as well as businesses teaching others how to count cards. For example:

• Mike Aponte of the Reptiles co-founded a company with former MIT Blackjack Team member David Irvine called the Blackjack Institute.
• Semyon Dukach of the Amphibians founded Blackjack Science.

References[edit]

Casino Players Club Card Scams

1. ^Griffin, Peter A. (1979). The Theory of Blackjack. Huntington Press. ISBN0-915141-02-7.
2. ^'How a team of students beat the casinos'. BBC.com. Retrieved 26 May 2014.
3. ^Blackjack Forum interview with Johnny Chang
4. ^The Twenty One Club: The annual blackjack ball hosts Gambling's Most Furtive (and Quirky) FraternityArchived 2009-04-20 at the Wayback Machine cigaraficionado.com, Sept/Oct 1999
5. ^Ian Kaplan (March 2004). 'review of Bringing Down the House'.
6. ^ThePOGG (10 November 2012). 'ThePOGG Interviews – Semyon Dukach – MIT Card Counting team captain'.
7. ^'ThePOGG Interviews – Nathaniel Tilton author of 'The Blackjack Life''. Retrieved 6 March 2013.
8. ^The Last Casino on IMDb.Retrieved 2009-11-03.

External links[edit]

Casino Players Card Scam Phone Calls